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                                                   Abstract 
 
We  consider  a  voluntary  contributions  game,  in  which  players  may  punish  others  after 
contributions  are  made  and  observed. The productivity of  contributions,  as captured in  the 
marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low 
productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a 
punishment  regime,  in  which  certain  individuals  are  permitted,  but  not  required,  to  have 
punishment  directed  toward  them.  The  punishment  system  can  condition  on  type  and 
contribution  history.  The  results  indicate  that  the  most  effective  regime,  in  terms  of 
contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless 
of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a 
tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice. 
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1. Introduction 
When a group or a society faces a social dilemma, a potential role for an institution to promote or 
enforce a cooperative norm arises. If such an institutional structure is not imposed exogenously, it 
must arise endogenously from a social choice process involving the affected individuals. In a situation 
in which individuals are symmetric and their incentives to cooperate are perfectly aligned, one might 
argue that agreeing on a mechanism to enforce collective action might be relatively simple. The 
mechanism can require the individuals concerned to sacrifice an equal amount, all individuals can be 
punished  similarly  when  deviating  from  appropriate  behavior,  and  all  individuals  behaving 
appropriately can benefit equally.  
  On the other hand, suppose that players are heterogeneous. Then it is possible that the task of 
endogenously choosing an appropriate system to promote cooperation may be more difficult, and 
suboptimal institutions might emerge from the process. In this paper, we consider the effect that one 
type of heterogeneity among agents has on the institutions that emerge from a voting process. We 
employ an experimental approach. Our research strategy is the following. We take a setting, in which 
it is known from previous experimental results that effective institutions emerge from a simple voting 
process  when  individuals  are  symmetric.  We  then  construct  an  experimental  environment that  is 
identical, except for the fact that there are two types of individual that differ only in the externality 
generated from their contributions, and introduce an analogous voting process. We find that in the 
heterogeneous environment poor institutions often emerge,  
       The environment that we consider is a version of a popular experimental paradigm to investigate 
social dilemmas, the voluntary contributions mechanism for public good provision. This is a game, in 
which players simultaneously choose a fraction of their endowment to contribute toward the provision 
of a public good. The level of contribution can be readily interpreted as a measure of cooperation. 
While total group payoff is increasing in the sum of members’ contributions, and the social optimum 
is reached only when all individuals contribute all of their endowment, the dominant strategy for each 
player is to contribute zero. A recent focus has been on the role of decentralized sanctions, the ability 
of individuals to punish others based on their level of cooperation (Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 
1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Masclet et al., 2003; Sefton et al., 2007). Such sanctions have 
been shown to be effective in increasing cooperation
1, but to have mixed effects on welfare (Bochet et 
al., 2006; Tan, 2008). 
                                                 
1  Two  of  the  limitations  that  apply  to  this  result  are  the  following.  The  first  is  that,  as  soon  as 
counterpunishment  is  allowed,  some  of  the  beneficial  effect  is  negated  (Denant-Boemont  et  al.,  2007; 
Nikiforakis, 2008). The second is that there is some tendency to punish cooperative players. This tendency has 
been termed anti-social or perverse punishment (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006), and the incidence of this behavior 
varies greatly depending on population studied (Gächter and Herrmann, 2008).  
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  In the studies listed above, the experimenter imposed the sanctioning institution exogenously. 
There has been recent interest in endogenous punishment institutions that the affected individuals 
select themselves. Gürerk et al. (2005, 2006) permit individual players to choose, at the beginning of 
each period, between membership in a group with, and one without, sanctioning opportunities. They 
find that, while the majority of players opt for the sanction-free institution in the initial periods, the 
entire population eventually migrates to the group in which sanctioning is permitted. Botelho et al. 
(2005) construct a 21-period game in which players can vote, by majority rule, whether to allow for 
punishment  in  the  last  period  after  experiencing  both  systems  with  and  without  sanctioning 
possibilities for ten periods each. They find a tendency for groups to vote for the system that yielded 
them a higher payoff previously, which in their study was typically an institution that allowed no 
punishment. Sutter et al. (2006) let players decide whether to impose a punishment or reward regime 
at the beginning of a session, by unanimity, and find that individuals prefer rewards, even though 
payoffs are higher under punishment. Decker et al. (2008) allow individuals to vote for enforcement 
of  the  maximum,  median,  or  minimum  punishment  assigned  to  an  individual,  and  also  report  a 
tendency to vote for the particular institution that yielded the highest payoff previously.
  They find 
that the maximum rule is the most effective in generating high contributions. A number of studies find 
that contribution rates under mechanisms enacted endogenously by group members are higher than 
when the same institutions are imposed exogenously (Tyran and Feld, 2004; Kosfeld et al., 2008; Bó 
et al, 2007).
2   
  Ertan et al. (2005) is the study most closely related to ours. They study a setting, in which players 
vote at regular intervals by majority on whether to allow punishment of group members who have 
made contributions that are (a) below-average, (b) above-average, and (c) exactly equal to the average 
for the group. If a punishment rule is passed, any group member may assign punishment to any 
individual meeting the criterion of the rule. The rules are not mutually exclusive: any, none, or all of 
punishment  options  (a)  –  (c)  could  be  approved.  They  observe  that  most  groups,  while  initially 
choosing not to allow any punishment at all, eventually vote to allow punishment of below-average 
contributors  exclusively.  A  minority  of  groups  ban  any  form  of  punishment  throughout  their 
interaction, and no groups ever vote to allow punishment of above-average contributors. Since both 
contributions and earnings are highest when individuals can be punished if and only if they contribute 
less than the  group  average, the  authors  conclude that  groups  successfully  converge  to the  most 
                                                 
2 Two recent studies have the feature that the punishment institution voted into place only governs players who 
vote in favor of it. In Kroll et al. (2007), agents first play a voluntary contributions game for ten periods, and 
make and vote on non-binding proposals of minimum total contributions. They report that voting is an empty 
commitment unless punishment is used to enforce the outcome. Kosfeld et al. (2008) have a similar finding that 
as long as there is no provision of a binding commitment, cooperation itself is difficult to attain.   
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efficient institutional structure. The focus of our study here is to consider whether this ability of a 
voting process to converge to the optimal institutional structure is robust to a particular change in the 
environment. This change is the existence of heterogeneity in the value to the group of individuals’ 
contributions.  
  In all of the studies mentioned above, agents were homogenous in terms of the value that their 
contribution generated for the group, so that the tradeoff between the social benefit of cooperation 
and the private benefit of free riding was identical for each member of the group. In many situations, 
however,  heterogeneity  among  group  members  may  exist,  due  to  differing  productivity  of  their 
contributions. Consider, for example, a group of individuals that must complete a project for which all 
group members will receive equal credit. However, the effort of some group members, because of 
higher productivity in the required task, yields greater benefits for all than the same effort from other 
members. For example, one hour of work on the part of one individual may yield the same output as 
three hours of another individual’s work. Because all group members, including the contributor, reap 
the  benefits  of  an  individual’s  effort,  this  heterogeneity  in  productivity  is  equivalent  to  a 
heterogeneous cost of effort among individuals, with those with higher productivity also having lower 
unit opportunity cost of contribution.
3  Thus, the gains and costs of a contribution depend on who 
made  the  contribution. The  basic  incentive  structure  of  this  situation  can  be captured  within  the 
experimental paradigm described above if the marginal per-capita return of a contribution (MPCR) 
differs depending on who is making the contribution.
 4 
  In this paper, we consider whether two key results of Ertan et al (2005) apply to a setting in which 
heterogeneity of group members’ productivity, as expressed in the marginal-per-capita return of their 
                                                 
3 Some experiments have distinguished between the private benefit to the individual making the contribution 
and the benefit of the contribution to other agents, calling these the internal and external returns, respectively. 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), Brandts and Schram (2001) and Margreiter et al. (2005) vary the internal return, 
while holding constant the external return. In other words, contribution costs of players differ, but every group 
member benefits the same given a contributed token, regardless of the identity of the contributor. 
4 There are a few prior experiments in which MPCR differs among group members. Fisher et al. (1995) conduct 
a voluntary contributions game in which they assign half of the group members an MPCR of 0.75 and the other 
half  an  MPCR  of  0.3.  By  comparing  the  group  average  contributions  with  those  of  homogenous  groups 
featuring MPCR of 0.75 and 0.3, they conclude that the subjects seem to focus only on their own MPCR: 
players assigned 0.75 contribute more than those with 0.3. Reuben and Riedl (2007) study a setting in which 
one player has an MPCR of 1.5, and thus a dominant strategy to contribute, and the others have an MPCR of 
0.5.
 They allow individuals to punish others after observing the contribution profile. They find that punishment 
is not as effective as in a control group where everyone is endowed with the same MPCR of 0.5. Fewer strong 
free-riders are punished, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. 
  Margreiter et al (2005) study voting in a common pool resource game, with players with heterogeneous 
contribution  costs. Players  are  asked to  vote  on  proposals  about the  proportion  of  endowment  each  group 
member  contributes,  at  the  end  of  every  period.  If  a  certain  proposal  is  selected  by  majority  vote,  it  is 
automatically implemented in the next period. They find that compared to homogeneous groups, the number of 
distinct proposals is markedly larger in heterogeneous groups, but fewer agreements are reached by majority 
voting.    
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contributions, exists. The two results are that (1) permitting but restricting permissible punishment to 
below-average contributors yields the highest payoff among punishment institutions that condition on 
deviations from average contribution level, and (2) when engaged in repeated opportunities to vote, 
groups  converge  to  this  punishment  institution  over  time.  In  our  experiment,  as  in  Ertan  et  al., 
individuals vote at regular intervals on whether individuals are permitted have punishment directed 
toward them. After a regime is selected, based on majority vote, it is in effect for that group for a 
fixed and known number of periods. As in the Ertan et al. study, we vary, as a treatment variable, the 
number of periods that the results of one vote are in effect. Studying different voting terms is a 
potentially important aspect of institutional design, and the effect of a punishment system could well 
depend on the length of time a system is locked in and not subject to change. 
       The parametric structure of our experimental environment follows Tan (2008). She studies a 
four-person voluntary contributions game with two types of agent. Two players have an MPCR of 
0.9, so that each token they contribute yields 0.9 tokens to all group members, and the other two 
players have an MPCR of 0.3. All agents are permitted to punish any other agent in any period. Tan 
finds that punishment is not very effective in increasing contributions among heterogeneous agents. 
In groups that achieve cooperation, high MPCR players punish low MPCR players frequently for 
their free-riding behavior. However, when controlling for the contribution level of the recipient of 
punishment, high MPCR players receive more punishment than those with low MPCR.  
       There  is  reason  to  believe  that  heterogeneity  of  MPCR  may  make  a  difference  in  which 
institutions emerge from the voting process. The different costs of contribution among players may 
inhibit the establishment of a contribution norm, and create differing beliefs among agents about the 
appropriate level of contribution that each type should make. This may make it more difficult to 
achieve consensus on which punishment system to implement and may lead to a conflict between 
different types of agent. Such conflicts may prove sustained and durable, with adverse long-term 
effects on contributions and welfare. Indeed, as described in section four, the principal results we 
obtain  are  the  following.  We  find  that,  consistent  with  Ertan  et  al.  (2005),  the  most  effective 
institution, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of below-average 
contributors only, regardless of productivity type. However, unlike in the Ertan et al. environment, 
groups often fail to enact this institution, especially when the votes are held relatively frequently. 
Under these conditions, groups typically establish inefficient regimes, and particularly common is a 
system  in  which  no  punishment  is  permitted.  No  group  ever  votes  to  enable  punishment  of  all 
individuals, regardless of their type or contribution level. Players are more likely to vote to allow 
punishment of below-average contributors and the type other than their own, and they attempt to 
escape from future penalty opportunities by disallowing punishment rules targeting their own type.  
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For many groups, this behavior appears to create an insurmountable roadblock to the establishment of 
the appropriate institution. 
      The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the experiment and 
in Section 3, we advance several hypotheses about the performance of different punishment regimes. 
In Section 4, we present an analysis of the data. Finally, in Section 5, we make some concluding 
remarks.             
                    
2. The Experiment 
2.1 General Setting 
The experiment consisted of six sessions that were conducted at CentER Lab, at Tilburg University in 
the Netherlands. There were two treatments, the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments. Each 
treatment was in effect in three of the sessions. Forty-eight subjects, among whom 42% were females, 
and all of whom were students at Tilburg University, participated in the study. Some of the subjects 
had previously participated in economic experiments, but all were inexperienced with the voluntary 
contributions mechanism. Each subject took part in only one session of the study. On average, a 
session lasted about 80 minutes (including initial instruction and payment of the subjects), and a 
subject  earned  an  average  of  454  tokens  (approximately  18.16  euros).  The  experiment  was 
programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
      Each session included eight participants that were separated into two groups of four. At the start of 
each session, the computer program randomly assigned the subjects into different groups according to 
their choices of terminal upon entering the room for the session. All individuals remained in the same 
group for their entire 30-period experimental session. All 30 periods of play counted toward final 
earnings, and there were no practice periods at the beginning of the sessions. At the beginning of each 
period, every player was randomly given an identification number from 1 to 4 to distinguish her 
actions from those of the others during that period. To prevent the formation of individual reputations, 
however, the numbers were randomly reallocated at the beginning of every period. 
      Productivity heterogeneity was generated by randomly assigning half of the group members a 
high MPCR of 0.9 (players of this type will be referred to as type A players) and the other half a low 
MPCR  of  0.3 (type  B  players). Participants  were informed of their type  at the beginning  of  the 
session, and their types remained fixed for the duration of the session.
5 The instructions used in the 
experiment were modified on the basis of those used in Ertan et al. (2005) and Tan (2008). 
                                                 
5 Neutral language was used in the experiment. Players with MPCR of 0.9 were referred to as "type A" and players with 
MPCR of 0.3 were "type B". Moreover, potentially biased terms such as “contribution” and “punishment” were avoided. For 
example, punishment was termed as "points that reduce another player's income".  
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2.2 Timing 
      The 30 periods that made up each session were divided into three segments, as illustrated in 
figure 1. In the first segment, comprising periods 1 – 3, subjects played the voluntary contributions 
game without the possibility of punishment. In the second segment, consisting of periods 4 – 6, a 
second  stage  was  added  to  the  game  in  which  any  player  could  punish  any  other  player,  after 
observing all players’ contributions. In the third segment, which made up the remainder of the session 
(periods 7 -30), the punishment system in place depended on the outcome of a voting process. Voting 
took place every two periods in the Short-Term treatment, and every eight periods in the Long-Term 
treatment.  
  In each period of the first segment, the following occurred. Each subject was endowed with ten 
tokens, with a conversion rate of 25 tokens = 1 Euro. Subjects simultaneously and independently 
divided their endowment between a private account and a group account. The income of an individual 
equaled the number of tokens she put in her private account, plus .9 times the total contributions of 
type A players in her group, plus .3 times the total contribution of type B players in her group. That is, 
a player’s income in each period equaled 
(1)                                       10 0.9 0.3 ij ij A B
j A j B
I C C C
= =
= − + × + × ∑ ∑  
         where Cij is the contribution of the ith player of type j. This calculation was displayed on subject 
i’s computer screen together with the contributions and earnings of all group members at the end of 
each period.  
  In period 4 – 6, each period was made up of two stages. There was a second, punishment, stage 
subsequent to the contribution stage described above. In the second stage, subjects were given the 
opportunity to send points ranging from 0 to 10 to any group member. Every point that a particular 
subject sent to another reduced the sender’s earnings by one token and reduced the earnings of the 
recipient by two tokens. Thus, subject i’s income in each period equaled: 
(2)                                 10 0.9 0.3 2 ij ij A B ik ki
j A j B k i k i
I C C C P P
= = ≠ ≠
= − + × + × − − × ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
        Where  ik
k i
P
≠ ∑ was the sum of points subject i sent to all group members, and  ki
k i
P
≠ ∑ was the sum 
of points she received from all others. At the end of each period, the computer displayed the subject’s 
own type, the tokens she and all group members contributed, the total number of points she received 
and assigned to others, her income for the current period and how it was calculated. Subjects were not 
informed about how much punishment other individuals sent or received.  
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       In the third segment of each session, periods 7 – 30, the following took place. Every two periods 
in the Short-Term treatment, as well as every eight periods in the Long-Term treatment, a voting stage 
occurred at the beginning of a period. During the voting stage, every subject was required to answer 
each of the following four questions by clicking a box that corresponded to either (a) yes, (b) no, or 
(c) no preference.
6 The four questions were the following:  
  I vote to allow a person’s earnings to be reduced if the person is a: 
      (1) Type A player assigning less than the average amount to group account. 
      (2) Type A player assigning more than the average amount to group account. 
      (3) Type B player assigning less than the average amount to group account. 
      (4) Type B player assigning more than the average amount to group account.  
         
      After all subjects gave their answers, the computer tabulated the votes. If the number of “Yes” 
votes on one of the questions exceeded the number of “No” votes, the reduction specified in the 
question was allowed; otherwise it was not. A “No preference” vote did not count towards the voting 
outcome.  Since  there  were  four  questions,  the  number  of  possible  outcomes,  or  punishment 
institutions,  was
4 2 16 = .  Subjects  were  informed  of  the  punishment  system  instituted,  and  the 
number of periods this institution would be in effect. In the Long-Term treatment, a vote occurred 
every eight periods, and the same institution remained in effect for the eight-period interval following 
the vote. In the Short-Term treatment, a vote took place every two periods, and the resulting system 
was in effect for the two periods. 
       
            [Figure 1: About Here] 
         
       In every period, regardless of whether a vote occurred in the current period, the contribution and 
punishment stages occurred in a similar manner as in the second segment. During the punishment 
stage, subjects decided how many points to send to members meeting the punishment requirement, 
but were required by the computer program to abide by the restrictions resulting from the last vote, 
whether it occurred in the current or in a prior period. The feedback presented to subjects at the end of 
a period in the third segment was the same as in the second segment.  
              
2.3 The Experiment of Tan (2008) 
                                                 
 
6 Ertan et al. (2005) also included an option to vote to allow punishment of those players whose contributions were exactly 
equal to the average. This option is not included in this experiment, however, because if two more questions concerning 
average contributors of each type are included, the potential number of punishment systems would increase to 64.  
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Tan (2008), in a related study, examines the effect of an exogenously imposed punishment institution 
on players with heterogeneous productivity. A number of features of that study are similar to the one 
reported here. The parametric structure of the game is the same in the two studies. Players played the 
voluntary contributions game under a fixed matching protocol, with two high productivity players 
with an MPCR of 0.9, and two low productivity players with an MPCR of 0.3. In one treatment, no 
punishment  was  possible,  as  in  periods  1  –  3  in  the  study  reported  here.  In  another  treatment 
punishment of any other player was permitted, as in periods 4 – 6 here. 
  However, there are important differences between the two studies. In the Tan (2008) study, the 
punishment  system  is  imposed  exogenously  rather  than  enacted  endogenously  by  participants 
themselves. Furthermore, in the Tan experiment, the length of a session is 15 periods, and the same 
punishment condition remained in effect for the entire session. While it is not the principal purpose of 
the study reported here, the similar parametric structure between our experiment and Tan (2008) 
allows us to make rough comparisons between the two studies, and we do so with regard to aspects of 
individual behavior in section 4. 
                             
3.  Hypotheses 
Our analysis is organized as a test of several hypotheses. The first two concern whether particular 
results obtained in Ertan et al. (2005) generalize to our environment. The first hypothesis is that the 
most effective system for promoting high welfare is to permit punishment of only below-average 
contributors, regardless of their productivity, a system we refer to hereafter as Pun-Low. The rationale 
for the hypothesis is that such a system enables the group to punish low contributors to influence their 
behavior, and prohibits punishment of high contributors in order to encourage them to continue their 
behavior. Pun-low was the most effective of all of the available systems in Ertan et al.’s (2005) 
environment. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Efficient Punishment Regime Hypothesis): The most efficient punishment regime, in 
the sense of yielding the highest welfare, is to allow punishment of below-average contributors only, 
regardless of productivity (Pun-Low). 
 
     Ertan et al. observed that Pun-Low was reached consistently after several iterations of the voting 
process. We  consider  whether this  finding  carries over  to our  setting  with  heterogeneous  agents. 
While there is a powerful collective incentive to converge to the most efficient arrangement, there is 
also reason to believe that it may not do so in an environment with heterogeneous agents. The work of  
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Margreiter  et  al.  (2005)  indicates  that  voting  does  not  guarantee  that  an  institution  with  high 
contributions  and  welfare  emerges  when  contribution  costs  vary  among  group  members.  More 
generally, heterogeneity in MPCR leads to lower contributions (Fisher et al. 1995) even in settings in 
which punishment is possible (Tan, 2008), and this difficulty in cooperating may carry over to the 
institution formation phase. Nonetheless, as a null hypothesis we propose that the voting process will 
behave effectively in discovering the most efficient arrangement: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Punishment Regime Convergence Hypothesis): Convergence to the most efficient rule 
occurs over the course of the voting process.  
 
      Note that either Hypotheses 1 or 2 may be supported while the other one is not supported. Pun-
Low may lead to the greatest level of welfare, but may not be attained with the voting process. An 
institution other than Pun-Low may generate the highest welfare and also be the outcome of the 
voting process.  The next hypothesis concerns the difference between treatments. A priori, the effect 
of lengthening the time that an institution is in effect on per-period welfare is ambiguous. On one 
hand, longer governance duration implies a greater commitment to the results of a given vote, and 
that may create greater incentives to form more effective institutions. On the other hand, the shorter 
governance  duration  in  the  Short-Term  treatment  offers  groups  more  opportunities  to  search  for 
effective institutions, and to discard ineffective ones, than does the Long-Term treatment. Since these 
two  effects  operate  in  different  directions
7,  we  hypothesize  that  the  contributions  made  and  the 
welfare attained are not different between the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments.                                
 
Hypothesis  3  (Governance Duration Hypothesis): Contributions and welfare are not significantly 
different between the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments. 
 
4. Results  
The first hypothesis concerns the relative performance of different institutional structures in terms of 
contributions and welfare. Table 1 displays the average group contributions and earnings under each 
institution across treatments. The table shows how many times each punishment system was enacted, 
how many periods it was in effect, the average contribution and welfare level (measured as subject 
earnings) it generated, and its rank among the systems in terms of contribution and welfare levels. 
                                                 
 
7 Ertan et al. (2005) also vary the length of time the results of a vote are in force, but do not discuss the effect of governance 
duration on outcomes.  
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Nine out of 16 possible combinations of punishment rules are enacted at least once in our dataset. The 
four most common combinations are: (1) to disallow punishment of any agent (which we will refer to 
as No-Pun), (2) to allow punishment of below-average contributors regardless of productivity (Pun-
Low), (3) to allow punishment of Type B players making below-average contributions (Pun-B-Low) 
and (4) to allow punishment of Type A players making below-average contributions (Pun-A-Low). 
These four structures account for almost 90% of the total voting outcomes. No group ever votes to 
permit  punishment  of  all  agents.  Result  1  summarizes  the  main  findings  concerning  the  relative 
performance of the institutions with regard to contributions and efficiency. 
 
                                                          Insert Table 1 about here 
 
RESULT 1: The efficient punishment regime hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is supported. The most 
effective  regime,  in  terms  of  both  contributions  and  earnings,  is  Pun-Low,  which  allows 
punishment of players with below-average contributions only, regardless of productivity. This 
is the case in both the Short-Term and Long-Term treatments.  
  
SUPPORT: According to table 1, the four most successful institutions all allow punishment of at least 
some below-average contributors. Pun-Low is the most effective institution in terms of contributions 
in both treatments, and in terms of welfare in the Short-Term treatment. In the Long-term treatment, 
Pun-Low is the second-ranked system of welfare after Pun-A-Low. Overall, in Pun-Low, the mean 
contribution level is almost three quarters of the total endowment, which is 73% more than the next 
best  system,  Pun-A-Low.    A  Mann-Whitney  rank-sum  test,  using  average  contributions  in  each 
session  for  the  periods  that  the  system  is  in  effect  as  the  unit  of  observation,  indicates  that 
contributions in Pun-Low are significantly greater than in Pun-A-Low (z = -2.364, p < 0.05) and than 
in Pun-B-Low (z = -2.030, p < 0.05). A similar result holds for welfare. Although welfare is not 
significantly greater in Pun-Low compared to Pun-A-Low (z = -0.447), it is significantly greater than 
under Pun-B-Low (z = -2.030, p < 0.05). □ 
 
       There are a number of other interesting patterns evident in the table. No-Pun is considerably less 
effective in generating contributions and earnings than the systems that allow punishment of below-
average contributors. There are also some differences in the incidence and relative performance of the 
institutions between treatments. Institutions permitting punishment of only above-average but not 
below-average  contributors  appear  only  in  the  Short-Term  treatment.  The  inefficient  No-Pun 
institution is in effect in more than twice as many periods in the Short-Term treatment than in the  
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Long-Term treatment. The Pun-A-Low institution is more effective in the Long-Term treatment than 
in the Short-Term treatment both in terms of contribution and earnings, while the opposite holds for 
Pun-B-Low.   
        
                                                          Insert Table 2 about here 
 
  Table 2 reports the results of a regression estimating the effect of the different institutions on 
contribution  and  welfare  levels.  The  data  in  the  first  three  periods  of  the  sessions,  in  which  no 
punishment regime is in effect, are the baseline of the regressions. Unrestricted punishment, in effect 
in periods 4 – 6 of each session, and in which players can reduce the earnings of any other player, 
does  not  lead  to  higher  contribution levels,  but  does  lower  earnings,  in both  treatments.  This  is 
indicated by the estimates for β1. The significantly positive β2 across all equations confirms the robust 
effect  of  allowing  for  punishment  of  below-average  contributors:  this  increases  group  average 
contribution levels and earnings relative to the baseline. The significantly negative coefficient β5 in 
indicates that if players vote out to disallow any form of punishment during the voting stage, group 
average  contributions  and  earnings  decrease  relative  to  a  situation  in  which  the  same  system  is 
imposed exogenously. 
       The second hypothesis concerned whether the most effective institutional structure emerges from 
the voting process. Our findings are summarized in result 2. 
 
                                                        Insert Figure 2 about here       
 
RESULT  2:  Punishment  Regime  Convergence  Hypothesis  (Hypothesis  2)  is  not  supported. 
Institutional rules fail to converge to the efficient Pun-Low system in either treatment. 
 
SUPPORT: Figure 2 shows the incidence of each institution in each of the sequence of votes in the 
two treatments. The horizontal axis of the figures represents the timing of the vote, with voting time 
“1” indicating the first vote in a session, which occurs at the beginning of period 7. The second 
“voting time” occurs in period 9 in the Short-Term and in period 15 in the Long-Term treatment. The 
vertical axis represents the number of groups, out of a total of six groups, that choose each system. 
None of the six groups votes for Pun-Low during the last voting stage in the Short-Term treatment, 
while only three of the six groups do so in the Long-Term treatment.  
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  As we can see from the data in the figures, the relatively efficient Pun-Low institution is chosen 
with greater frequency in the Long-Term treatment. However, the positive effect on welfare of the 
relatively frequent choice of Pun-Low in the Long-Term treatment is not sufficient to offset the even 
greater increase in contributions and welfare that occurs when subjects in the Short-Term treatment 
select Pun-Low. As stated in the introduction section, we vary the duration of the time interval that the 
results of an individual vote are in effect. Result 3 summarizes our findings.  
 
RESULT 3: The Governance Duration Hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) cannot be rejected. That is, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments are the 
same in terms of both contributions and welfare. 
 
SUPPORT:  Mann-Whitney rank sum tests of differences in contributions and welfare between the 
Short-Term and Long-Term treatment in periods 7 to 30 suggest that neither distributional difference 
is significant between the two treatments (z = 0.320 for contribution and 0.801 for earnings). □ 
 
  Figures 3a and 3b show the time series of earnings and punishment points assigned for each 
group, in the Long-Term and Short-Term treatments respectively. The vertical axis indicates the per-
capita  earnings  in  tokens  (the  maximum  possible  is  24,  and  the  level  corresponding  to  zero 
contribution and zero punishment is 10), and the number of punishment points allocated per capita. 
The horizontal axis is the period number. Both figures show that, while Pun-Low performs better than 
the other systems on average in terms of earnings, it remains inconsistent and only reaches welfare 
levels close to the potential maximum in some instances. It is also clear that punishment is effective 
in raising contributions, at least in the short run; in almost every period after which any punishment 
points are assigned, there is an increase in group earnings. The No-Pun institution consistently leads 
to zero or close to zero contributions, as reflected in average earnings near ten tokens. In the Long-
Term treatment, three groups achieve close to the maximum possible level of earnings, and they do by 
enacting  Pun-Low  or  Pun-A-Low.  In  the  Short-Term  treatment,  institutional  changes  are  quite 
frequent with at least four changes from one vote to the next occurring in each group. Only two 
groups achieve close to maximal earnings by the end of their session. One does so by enacting Pun-
Low, and the other with Pun-B-Low.  
 
          Figures 3a and 3b About Here 
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  Figures 4a and 4b show the voting behavior of individuals based on their type and contribution 
level in the period immediately preceding the vote. Each panel in the figures corresponds to the votng 
behavior  of  one  four  types/contribution  profiles  in  one  of  the  treatments.  Each  bar  indicates  the 
percentage voting in favor, voting against, and abstaining from each of the four punishment rules. The 
figures are constructed by classifying each player into one of the four categories: type A below-
average contributors (abbreviated to AL), type A above-average contributors (AH), type B below-
average  contributors  (BL)  and  type  B  above-average  contributors  (BH)  based  on  her  actual 
contribution one period before the voting stage. Then the number of “yes”, “no” and “no preference” 
votes are summed.  
 
                                              Insert Figure 4a and 4b about here 
 
      The figures illustrate the sharp conflicts between above-and below-average contributors, as well 
as between type A and type B players. When above-average contributors vote in favor of punishment 
of below-average contributors, they are much more likely to vote in favor of punishment of the other 
type. Likewise, when they vote against allowing punishment of above-average contributors, they are 
more likely to vote in favor of banning this punishment for their own type. Below-(above-) average 
contributors are more willing to vote to allow punishment of above-(below-) average contributors  
than of players who contribute similarly to themselves.
8 These patterns suggest that players try to shut 
down punishment channels that may point to them in the future. 
 
                                                          Insert Table 3 about here 
 
        Consider the following probit regression.  
(3)     
0 1 2 3







V yourself opp MPCR low con
type typeA opp con pun rec pun sent
β β β β
β β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + + + +
     
 
The dependent variable equals 1 if subject i votes to permit a specific punishment rule k in period t, 
and 0 otherwise. The first explanatory variable, yourself, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the rule 
allows  punishment of a  player with the same type and similar contribution behavior as player i. 
Opp_MPCR equals 1 if the voted item k refers to the other type of player, and Opp_con is analogous 
                                                 
 
8 There is one exception. In the Long-Term treatment, AH players rather than AL players are more willing to allow for 
punishment of BH players: 43.5% of AH players vote to allow for punishment of BH players while only 30.8% of AL 
players vote to allow for punishment of BH players.  
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for the opposite contribution level relative to the average. Low_con equals 1 if the voted item refers to 
someone making a below-average contribution. Typei is also a dummy equal to 1 if the player voting 
is a type A player, whereas TypeA equals to 1 if the voted rule targets type A players. Pun_rec and 
Pun_sent are continuous variables representing the total number of punishment points received from 
other players and sent to other players, respectively, in the period immediately preceding each vote. 
Result 4 summarizes the findings. 
 
RESULT  4:  (Voting  Behavior)  In  both  treatments,  the  willingness  of  players  to  vote  on 
punishment of a certain player is greater (i) if the punishment rule refers to the opposite MPCR, 
(ii) if the rule refers to below-average contributors, and (iii) if the punisher has a high MPCR. 
 
SUPPORT:  The estimates in table 3 show highly significant positive coefficients of β2 - β4. This 
indicates that players are more willing to vote in favor of a punishment rule if it targets the opposite 
productivity  type  (β2),  below-average  contributors  (β3),  and  if  the  player  voting  has  a  high 
productivity level (β4). □ 
  
       How does Pun-Low promote high contributions? The decision to free ride can be viewed as a 
result of a cost-benefit calculation. The possibility of punishment of below-average contributors may 
lower the return from making low contributions, and those for whom it is relatively low-cost to 
increase their contributions do so in response to the availability of punishment of low contributors.  
Consider  first  who  receives  punishment.  Previous  research  indicates  that  the  amount  of 
punishment points assigned is influenced by the difference in contribution between the punishing and 
the  punished  agent,  as  well  as  the  difference  between  the  negative  deviations  of  the  recipient’s 
contribution from the group average level (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; and Falk et 
al., 2005). Consider the following estimated equation, whose estimates are given in table 4. 
 
(4)     { } ( ) { } ( )
{ } ( ) { } ( )
0 1 2
3 4 5 6
max 0, max 0,
max 0, max 0,
ik
t t t t t
i k k i
t t t t t
k k i k ik
P c c c c
c c c c type type
β β β
β β β β ε
= + − + −
+ − + − + + +
 
where  1 i type =  if the punisher i has an MPCR of 0.9;  1 k type =  if the punished k has an MPCR of 
0.9, and 
_
t c is the average contribution in the group in period t. Because of the large number of zero 
values for the dependent variable, we estimate this specification by Tobit models with standard errors 
robust to within group correlation.   
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       Empirical evidence also shows that low contributors on average respond to punishment by raising 
their  contributions  in  the  subsequent  period  (Fehr  and  Gächter,  2000;  Masclet  et  al,  2003).  The 
change in the contribution of player i between period t and t+1 can be modeled as: 






i i k i
k
t t t
i i i k i i
k
c c P
c c ty p e ty p e P
β β
β β β ε
+  
− = +  
 
 





where  1 i type =  if i is a high-productivity player. β1 measures the effect of the total number of points 
subject i receives on her change in contribution from one period to the next, and β2 is the effect of the 
difference between individual i’s contribution and her group average contribution level in period t. β3 
measures any difference in overall contribution change between the two types, and β4 registers a 
differential response to punishment on the part of high and low productivity types. The estimates of 
models  (4)  and  (5),  for  the  data  from  the  exogenously-imposed  unrestricted  punishment  system 
studied in Tan (2008), are also included in tables 4 and 5 under the column labeled Unrestricted 
Punishment. In table 5, only the observations in which an individual’s contribution in period t is lower 
than his group’s average for the period are included. Result 5 summarizes the main findings from the 
estimation of (4) and (5). 
 
                                                         Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
RESULT  5:  (Punishment  Behavior  and  Responses)  Under  Pun-Low,  the  level  of  monetary 
sanction is increasing in the negative difference between the contributions of the recipient and 
the punisher in both treatments. Players increase their contributions more in the subsequent 
period, the  farther  their  contribution  is  below  the  group  average.  The  two  types  of  player 
respond similarly to the receipt of punishment.  
 
SUPPORT: The estimates in table 4 show that in both Pun-Low and the unrestricted punishment 
regime, there is a positive relation between the punishment points player i sends to player k and the 
extent to which player k’s contribution below that of player i’s. Unlike under unrestricted punishment, 
there is no relationship between the type of either the sanctioner or the sanctioned party in terms of 
punishment behavior. Table 5 indicates that in the Pun-Low regime, the contribution level increases 
significantly, the more a player’s contribution is below group average (β2). The insignificance of β1 
coefficient suggests that it is not the actual sanction that, but rather the possibility of punishment, 
triggers increases in contribution when punishment of below-average contributors in enabled. The  
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significant β4 coefficient in the Unrestricted Punishment data indicates that type A players are more 
likely to increase their contribution in response to punishment than type B players. However, this 
difference between types is not observed under Pun-Low. □ 
 
5. Conclusion 
  We have studied the voting behavior of groups that face a social dilemma. At regular intervals 
they vote to select a punishment institution, a set of conditions under which individuals may punish 
others. The issue is whether the most efficient institution, in terms of yielding maximal gains to the 
group, emerges from the voting process. We pose this question for an environment in which players 
are heterogeneous in terms of the benefit that their contributions yield to the group.      
  We observe that institutions that allow punishment of low contributors while immunizing high 
contributors perform well in generating high average contributions and welfare levels. This extends a 
previous result obtained by Ertan et al (2005) in a setting with symmetric players. Little punishment is 
actually applied; the threat of punishment is sufficient to generate high levels of cooperation.  
  However, we find that generally, groups do not adopt the most profitable institution even after 
having  repeated  opportunities  to  vote  for  its  enactment.  The  heterogeneity  of  players  generates 
conflicts  as  players  attempt  to  prevent  punishment  that  can  be  directed  at  themselves,  while 
attempting to enable it for other people. The result is that groups often find themselves with no ability 
to punish some or all free riders, and thus without a mechanism for enforcing high contributions.  
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Pun-Low  8  64  1  6.94  2  18.15  12  24  1  8.20  1  20.67 
Pun-A-Low  4  32  2  4.13  1  20.22  9  18  3  3.97  4  13.27 
Pun-B-Low  1  8  4  0.91  5  10.43  18  36  2  4.57  2  15.21 
No-Pun  3  24  5  0.22  4  10.29  25  50  7  0.41  7  10.50 
PunAL&PunBH  1  8  3  2.34  3  12.98  2  4  5  2.88  3  14.40 
PunAH&PunBL  1  8  6  0.28  6  9.66  1  2  4  3.63  6  11.03 
Pun-B-High  --  --  --  --  --  --  1  2  9  0.00  9  10.0 
Pun-A-High  --  --  --  --  --  --  3  6  6  2.00  5  12.3 
Pun-B  --  --  --  --  --  --  1  2  8  0.13  8  10.03 
Total  18  144        72  144          
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Table 2. Average Group Contributions and Earnings as a Function of Punishment System in Effect             




Average Contributions  Average Earnings 
 
  Long-Term Treatment  Short-Term Treatment  Long-Term Treatment  Short-Term Treatment 
β1 Unrestricted Punishment  0.306            0.657  -4.979***  -9.434*** 
  (0.578)           (0.492)   (1.127)  (2.486) 
β2 Pun Low Contributors   2.733***         2.989***  1.978**  5.351** 
  (0.497)  (0.502)  (0.969)  (2.317) 
β3 Punish A Low Contributors  -1.780***  -0.535  -1.669  -1.448 
  (0.626)  (0.507)  (1.220)  (2.486) 
β 4 Punish B Low Contributors  -0.875  1.030**  -2.295  0.496 
  (0.826)  (0.451)  (1.615)  (2.134) 
β 5 No Punishment  -1.934**  -1.971***  -2.921*  -4.217** 
  (0.843)  (0.417)  (1.642)  (2.025) 
β0 Constant  4.062***  3.459***  16.704***  14.718*** 
  (0.411)  (0.339)  (0.801)  (1.171) 
Adjusted R squared  0.353  0.399  0.273  0.459 
Observations  164  166  164  166 
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Contribution data corresponding to infrequently enacted institutions such as PunAL&PunBH, PunAH&PunBL, 
PunAH, PunBH and PunB are excluded because of the insufficient number of observations. The model specification is a fixed effect model with the variable “group” as the 
individual effect. The standard errors are robust within group correlation. A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of Long-Term and Short-Term treatments are 
equal. Therefore, we conduct a separate estimation for each treatment.   
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Table 3. Voting Patterns 
               
      Dependent variable: Voting of player i in favor of permitting punishment of player k at time t,
t
ik V  
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Only “yes” votes and “no” votes arte included in the 
estimation; abstentions are excluded. A random effect probit model with observations clustered within group correlation is 















  Long-Term Treatment  Short-Term Treatment 
β1 Yourself  -0.720*  0.182 
  (0.397)  (0.174) 
β2 Opposite MPCR  0.917***  1.259*** 
  (0.279)  (0.126) 
β3 Below Average Contributor  1.467***  0.968*** 
  (0.221)  (0.093) 
β4 Type i  1.017**  0.697*** 
  (0.406)  (0.217) 
β5 Type A Player  0.208  -0.151* 
  (0.203)  (0.091) 
β6 Opposite Contribution  0.252  0.526*** 
  (0.261)  (0.119) 
β7 Punishment Received at Period (t-1)  -0.007  -0.045 
  (0.073)  (0.033) 
β8 Punishment Sent at  Period (t-1)  0.051  0.010 
  (0.072)  (0.017) 
β0 Constant  -2.060***  -1.330*** 
  (0.489)  (0.219) 
Log-Likelihood  -123.72  -553.26 
Observations  268  1098  
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Table 4. Determinants of Sanctioning Behavior under Pun-Low 
 
                                                           Dependent Variable: Punishment points player i sends to player k at time t:
t
ik P  
Unrestricted punishment  Pun-Low 
 
(source Tan(2008))  Long-Term  Short-Term 
        -5.326***  -3.226***  -2.968*** 
β0 Constant 
(1.975)  (0.630)  (0.803) 
0.546**  0.752***  1.769***  β1 Negative Deviation from i’s Own Contribution 
{ } ( ) k i c c − , 0 max   (0.259)  (0.130)  (0.671) 
0.078  1.144***  --  β2 Positive Deviation from i’s Own Contribution 
{ } ( ) i k c c − , 0 max   (0.223)  (0.423)  -- 
0.799**  -0.201  -1.346  β3 Negative Deviation from Average 
{ } ( ) k c c− , 0 max   (0.352)  (0.199)  (0.862) 
-0.162  --  --  β4 Positive Deviation from Average 
{ } ( ) c ck − , 0 max   (0.242)  --  -- 
-0.497  -0.325  0.431 
β5 Type i 
(1.096)  (0.529)  (0.673) 
0.787*  -0.268  0.084 
β6 Type k 
(0.475)  (0.533)  (0.669) 
Log-Likelihood  -744.01  -277.957  -75.205 
Observations  1080  278  99 
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Only the observations of individuals who could potentially be punished are included.  Since the earnings of 
above-average contributors are not allowed to be reduced, the β4 coefficient is not included in the Pun-Low estimation. 
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Table 5. Subsequent changes in Contributions of Below-average 
Contributors as a Function of Punishment Received and Type 
               
                                     Dependent variable: changes of contribution 
1 t t
i i C C











β1 Punishment Received at Period t  0.289***  0.185 
  (0.067)  (0.162) 
β2 Deviation from average   0.169***  0.512** 
  (0.056)  (0.205) 
β 3 Type i  0.058  0.314 
  (0.401)  (0.805) 
β4  Punishment Received * Type i  0.340***  -0.304 
  (0.127)  (0.202) 
β0 Constant  0.891***  0.886 
  (0.258)  0.603 
Adjusted R squared  0.250  0.324 
Observations  161  66 
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. The model specification procedure is as follows. Firstly, 
for Pun-Low institution, a Chow-breaking point test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the contribution responses of the 
Long-Term treatment and Short-Term treatment are the statistically equivalent (F (3, 58) = 0.93, p=0.432). Therefore we 
only report one result by combining two treatments together. We then compare a pooled OLS with robust standard errors; a 
fixed effect model and a random effect model. The pooled OLS proves to be the best specification through a Language-
Multiplier test comparing with the random effect model and an F-test with a fixed effect model. For the unrestricted 
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Figure 2: Punishment Systems Enacted, Both Treatments, By Timing of Vote 
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                                 Figure 3a: Earnings and Punishment Levels in the Long-Term Treatment 
 
 
Notes: Each panel corresponds to one group in the treatment. The horizontal axis designates the number of periods, with the segments indicating the periods in which a specific 
institution is in effect. The names of the voted institutions are written in the upper part of each segment. The lines with crosses represent the group average earnings, and the lines 
with dots represent average sanction points. 
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                              Figure 3b: Earnings and Punishment Levels in the Short-Term Treatment 
 
Notes (Cont’d): PL is short for “allowing punishment of players with below average contributions”; PAL is short for “allowing punishment of type A players with below average 
contributions”; PBL is short for “allowing punishment of type B players with below average contributions”.  NP is short for “not allowing any form of punishment”. PB is short for 
“allowing punishment of type B players. PunAHBL is short for “allowing punishment of type A with above average contributions or type B players  with below average 
contributions”. PAH is short for “allowing punishment of type A players with above average contributions.  
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Figure 4a: Voting Patterns in the Long-Term Treatment, Percentage of 
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Figure 4b: Voting Patterns in the Short-Term Treatment, Percentage of 
Players Voting to Punish Each Type and Contribution Level 
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Appendix: Experiment Instructions 
              
Presented below are the instructions for the Long-Term Treatment. The instructions for the Short-
Term Treatment are identical except for the number of rounds an institution is in effect. For instance, 
in the sentence “After the voting, the decision is in effect for eight rounds. Then you will be asked to 
vote again for every eight rounds”, the number of rounds is changed from “eight” to “two”. 
 
The Long-Term Treatment Instruction 
           EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (PART I) 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of others, earn a considerable amount of 
money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
       The  instructions  we  have  distributed  to  you  are  solely  for  your  private  information.  It  is 
prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you have 
any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment 
and from all payments. 
       During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in TOKENS. At the end of the 
experiment the total number of tokens you have earned will be converted to Euros at the following 
rate: 
 
                                                     25 TOKENS= 1 Euro 
 
       Before the experiment starts the computer will assign you with a type. This type can be either 
“A” or “B”. The meaning of type A and type B will be explained in the “Detailed Instructions” below. 
Your type remains unchanged during the entire experiment.  
      The experiment is divided into rounds. In each round the participants are divided into groups of 
four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. Note that each group consists of 2 
participants with type “A” and 2 participants with type “B”. You will stay in the same group for 30 
rounds, but each participant will receive a different identity name, ID 1, 2, 3 or 4 within the group in 
each round. For example, a participant with ID 1 in this round may not be the same as a participant 
with ID 1 in another round. 
 
Detailed Instructions: 
At the beginning of each round each participant receives 10 tokens. In the following we call this his 
or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many 
of the 10 tokens you want to put into a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. Your 
choice should be an integer, i.e.numbers such as 0, 1, 2, …10. 
 
Your income consists of two parts:  
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1) the tokens which you have kept for yourself; 
2) the income from the project. This equals 90 percent of the total input of group members with type 
“A” to the project plus 30 percent of the total input of group members with type “B” to the project 
(including your own input). 
 
Your income in tokens in each round is therefore: 
(10-your input to the project)+ 
                0.9* (total input to the project of members with type “A”) +  
                                      0.3 * (total input to the project of members with type “B”) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this means that 
each group member receives the same income from the project.  
       For example, suppose the total sum that all group members put into the project is 30 tokens. 
Among these 30 tokens, 18 tokens are put by participants with type “A”; and 12 tokens are put by 
participants with type “B”. In this case each member of the group receives an income from the project 
of 0.9 * 18 + 0.3 * 12 = 19.8 tokens. If the total sum put into the project is 9 tokens, among which 3 
tokens are put by participants with type “A”; and 6 tokens are put by participants with type “B”, then 
each member of the group receives an income of 0.9 * 3 + 0. 3 * 6 =4.5 tokens from the project. 
       For each token that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 token. For every token you put 
into the project instead, the total input rises by one token. If you are type “A”, your income from the 
project would rise by 0.9*1=0.9 tokens. However the income of the other group members would also 
increase by 0.9 tokens each, so that the total income of the group from the project would rise by 3.6 
tokens. If you are type “B”, your income from the project would rise by 0.3*1=0.3 tokens. However 
the income of the other group members would also increase by 0.3 tokens each, so that the total 
income of the group from the project would rise by 1.2 tokens. Your input to the project therefore also 
raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for each token 
put by the other members to the project. For each token put in by a participant with type “A” you earn 
0.9*1=0.9 tokens; for each token put in by a participant with type “B” you earn 0.3 * 1=0.3 tokens. 
 




This is the screen which shows your type and 
your ID for this round. The ID will range from 
1 to 4. After checking this information, click 




Period       1 out of 1                                Remaining time [sec]: 40 
          
                               Your  type is : A 
Be aware for your type will remain the same in each round. 
Your ID for this ROUND is: 
                         3 
    Be aware for your ID will be different in each round. 






                                                                                       OK_          




Here you decide on how many tokens you will 
use  for  the  project  in  this  round.  Use  the 
keyboard to type in one of the numbers 0,1 … 
10 and confirm your choice by pressing OK. 
   Warning:  Before  pressing  OK,  make  sure 
your  choice  is  correct.  You  cannot  change 
your decision after you have pressed OK. 
   After having pressed OK, you will be asked 
to wait until all experiment participants have 
done the same. The experiment continues only 
after all experiment participants have pressed OK. We therefore kindly ask you not to delay your 
decision too much. After pressing OK, a waiting screen will appear. After all experiment participants 




In  the  upper  part  of  your  screen  you  find  a 
table with information on your type and your 
ID,  the  number  of  tokens  chosen  by  all 
participants  in  your  group,  the  income  you 
earned and its calculation. In the lower part, 
you  find  a  table  with  information  on tokens 
put into the project and earnings for all group 
subjects. 
 
Click on OK if you are done with checking the 
information. 
 
The experiment will begin with three rounds of play. Each round you begin with a new 10 tokens to 
allocate, and each round’s earnings are independent of the others. After these three rounds, there will 
be further instructions. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment. 
 
The experiment now starts with a quiz to make sure that everybody understands how you earn your 
points. After finishing the quiz, please raise your hand for answer checking. After all participants 
answered all the questions correctly, the experiment will begin. 
Period       out of 1                                Remaining time [sec]:  36  
                   
        
 
                           You are type: A 
                 Your endowment is 10 TOKENS 
How many tokens would you like to put into this project? 
       Your Decision:  ________             
 
 
                                  OK_        
Period       out of 1                                Remaining time [sec]:  28  
                                                   Your type is  A 
Your ID is 1. 
The results of this round are as follows: 
   TOKENS you put in the project:    9 
      The total TOKENS of your group put into the project:   19 
                                Income you earned in this ROUND:  15.7 
         Income Calculation: 10 – 9 + 0.9 * ( 9 + 6 ) + 0.3 * ( 3 + 1) = 15.7 
 
      The results of all the group members are as follows: 
 
 




ID (type)  1 (A)  2 (B)  3 (A)  4 (B) 
Tokens put into this project  9.0  3.0  6.0  1.0 
Earning of this ROUND  15.7  21.7  18.7  23.7 
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Quiz 
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following questions: 
 
About the experiment setting (Yes/ No): 
a)  If you are assigned with type “A”, does your type change in different rounds? Yes/No 
b)  Are there 2 participants with type “A” and 2 participants with type “B” in a group? Yes/No 
c)  Are you in the same group in different rounds? Yes/No 
d)  Is a person with ID1 in Round 2 definitely the same with a person with ID1 in Round 3? Yes/No 
 
2.  You are assigned with type “A”. Suppose each group member has an endowment of 10 tokens. 
Nobody (including yourself) put in any tokens to the project. How high is: 
a)  Your income for the period? _________ 
b)  The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
 
3. You are assigned with type “B”. Suppose each group member has an endowment of 10 tokens. You 
put in 10 tokens to the project. Besides you, a participant with type “A” puts in 3 tokens into the 
project; another participant with type “A” puts in 6 tokens into the project; and the third participant 
with type “B” puts in 2 tokens into the project . What is: 
a)  Your income for the period? _________ 
b)  The income of the group member which is type A and put 3 tokens into the project for the period? 
_________ 
 
4. You are assigned with type “A”. Suppose each group member has an endowment of 10 tokens. 
Besides you, a participant with type “A” puts in 4 tokens into the project; another participant with 
type “B” puts in 5 tokens into the project; and the third participant with type “B” puts in 3 tokens into 
the project . 
a)  What is your income if you put in 0 tokens to the project? _________ 
b)  What is your income if you put in 5 tokens to the project? _________ 
 
                                    EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (PART II) 
 
After this break for instructions, you and the same three members of your group will be interacting 
for another three rounds. As with the three rounds just completed, each of these rounds begins with a 
decision on assigning ten tokens to a group account or to a personal account. This time, however, 
each round also includes a second stage of decision-making. 
       At the beginning of the second stage, a screen will show you how much each of your group 
members puts into the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to register your disapproval of 
each other group member’s decision by assigning points to the other three participants in your group. 
       You must decide how many points to send to each of the other three group members. If you do 
not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. Every point you  
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send will reduce your earnings by 1 token AND reduce the earnings of the participant receiving it by 
2 tokens. 
        Whether and by how much a person’s income from the first stage is reduced depends on the total 
of the points he/ she received from all of the other members of his/her group. If somebody received a 
total of 3 points (from all other group members in this round), his or her income would be reduced by 
6 tokens. If somebody received a total of 4 points, his or her income would be reduced by 8 tokens. 






        We will now explain how the computer screens look like. Note that Screen 1 to Screen 3 are 




In the upper part of this screen you find a table 
with information on the type of each participant, 
the number of tokens chosen for the project by 
each  subject  in  stage  1  of  this  round  and  the 
number of tokens earned in Stage 1. 
   In the lower part of this screen, you are asked 
to  make  a  decision  on  how  many  points  you 
would like to assign to reduce earnings of each 
of the three other participants. Your choice must 
be integer, i.e. numbers like 0,1,2,…10. Select 
OK, when you are ready to continue. A waiting screen will appear. The experiment continues only 





In  this  screen  you  will  be  provided  with 
information about this round. You will be shown 
the tokens you and all participants put into the 
project, the total number of points you received 
and assigned to others, the income of this round 
and its calculation.  
       Click on OK if you are done with checking 
Your total income from this round (two stages together) is therefore calculated as 
follows: 
= ( income from the 1st stage –  
points assigned to other participants) – 
2 * total points received by three other participants 
Period      1 out of 1                                Remaining time [sec]:  36             
 
Your ID is 1 
Your type is A. 
TOKENS input of your group:  
    ID 1 ( type A ) : 9.0 
    ID 2 ( type B ) : 3.0 
    ID 3 ( type A ) : 6.0 
    ID 4 ( type B ) : 1.0 
 
Earnings of members in your 
group: 
 
         ID 1 ( type A ) : 15.7 
         ID 2 ( type B ) : 21.7 
         ID 3 ( type A ) : 18.7 
         ID 4 ( type B ) : 23.7 
Whom would you like to send points to in STAGE2? 
Choose here to whom you want to SEND POINTS and choose the 
amount you want to send to them. 
                                    ID 1  ______                   
                                    ID 2  ______                   
                                    ID 3  ______         
                                    ID 4          __                                                 OK_    
Period      1 out of 1                                Remaining time [sec]:  28  
                    
 
                                            
                                                   Your type is  A 
Your ID is 1. 
                          The results of this round are as follows: 
TOKENS you put in the project:    9 
       The total TOKENS your group put into the project:   19 
     The total POINTS you sent to other group members:   2 
The total POINTS received from all other group members:   3 
                                Income you earned in this ROUND:  7.7 
                                 Income Calculation: 15.7 – 2 * 3 –2 = 7.7 
                                                         
 
 
  OK_       
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the information. 
 
The experiment will continue with another three rounds of play. After these three rounds, there will be 
further instructions. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any question at the moment. 
 
The experiment now starts with a quiz to make sure that everybody understands how you earn your 
points. After finishing the quiz, please raise your hand for answer checking. After all participants 
answered all the questions correctly, the experiment will continue. 
 
1.  Suppose in the second stage of a period, you distribute the following amounts of monetary points 
to the other three group members: 9, 5, and 0.What is the total cost of the tokens you distribute? 
________ 
2.  What are your costs if you send a total of 0 tokens? ________ 
3.  By how many tokens will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total of 
0 monetary points from the other group members? ________ 
4.  By how many tokens will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you receive a total of 
5 tokens from the other group members? ________ 
 
                                 EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS (PART III) 
 
In the remaining parts of the experiment, you will play for three sets of eight rounds each in the same 
group of four subjects. Before this part begins, each group will decide, by voting, whether to permit 
subjects to reduce one another’s earnings after learning of their assignments to the group account. It 
will be possible to allow reductions of a type A and/or type B subject who assigns more than the 
average to the group account, and/or of type A or type B subjects who assign less than the average to 
the group account. Once the decision has been made by your group, it will be in force for the next 
eight rounds of the experiment. 
 
We  will  now  explain  how  the  computer 




In this screen you are asked to answer “Yes”, 
“No”, or “No preference” to four questions by 
clicking  the  box  to  the  right  of  each  of  the 
three choices. For each question, if the number 
of  “Yes”  vote  in  your  group  exceeds  the 
Period      1 out of 1                                Remaining time [sec]:  28  
I vote to allow a person’s earnings to be reduced if he/she is a: 
 
(1) Type A player who assigns less than the average       Yes       
    amount to the group account                                          No        
                                                                        No preference                                                     
(2) Type A player assigns more than the average            Yes        
    amount to the group account                                          No        
                                                                       No preference           
(3) Type B player assigns less than the average              Yes        
    amount to the group account                                          No        
                                                                         No preference         
(4) Type B player assigns more than the average             Yes       
    amount to the group account                                          No        




  OK_      
  
  37 
number of “No” vote, the reductions in question will be allowed; otherwise they will not. A “No 
preference” vote does not count towards the voting outcome. 
     Click on OK if you are done with answering the questions. 
     Warning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your decision 
after you have pressed OK. 
      After having pressed OK, you will be asked to wait until all experiment participants have done the 
same. The experiment  continues only after all  experiment participants  pressed OK. We  therefore 
kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much. After pressing OK, a waiting screen will appear. 




In this screen you will be informed of the 
outcome  under  which  your  group  will 
operate  for  the  next  eight  rounds.  The 
possible messages are listed in the appendix 
below. Note that only one of these messages 
will show up on the screen.  
     Click  on  OK  if  you  are  done  with 
checking the information. 
     After the voting, the decision is in effect 
for eight rounds. Then you will be asked to vote again for every eight rounds. During the reduction 
stage  of  each  round,  if  the  earnings  of  certain  group  members  are  voted  “allow  to  be  reduced” 
because of the rules decided by your group, you can decide whether to send points to the group 
members meeting the description. On the other hand, the reduction boxes for any individuals whom 
your group has  decided cannot have  their  earnings reduced will automatically  appear  with  zeros 
inside, which cannot be changed.  
 
It is important that you fully understand the voting process before we continue. Please raise your hand 
















Voting outcome of your group: 
Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type B player who 













    OK_        
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Possible messages regarding to voting outcomes: 
(1) Your group has voted not to allow group members to reduce one another’s earnings 
(2) Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of any other group member. 
(3) Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type B player who assigns less 
than the average to the group account. 
(4) Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type B player who assigns more 
than the average to the group account. 
(5) Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type A player who assigns less 
than the average to the group account. 
(6) Your group has voted to allow members to reduce the earnings of Type A player who assigns more 
than the average to the group account. 
(7) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of players assigning less 
than average to the group account regardless of their types. 
(8) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of players assigning more 
than average to the group account regardless of their types. 
(9) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B players. 
(10)Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B player assigning 
less than group average AND Type A player assigning more than average to the group account. 
(11)Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B player assigning 
more than group average AND Type A player assigning less than average to the group account. 
(12) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type A players. 
(13) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B players AND 
Type A players assigning less than average to the group account. 
(14) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type B players AND 
Type A players assigning more than average to the group account. 
(15) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type A players AND 
Type B players assigning more than average to the group account. 
(16) Your group has voted to allow group members to reduce the earnings of Type A players AND 
Type B players assigning less than average to the group account. 
 